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ABSTRACT 
The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion that individual rights ought to be insulated 
from the tyranny of the majority.  However, as interest group theory teaches us, democratic decision-making suffers 
from another systemic failure that is no less pernicious, no less ubiquitous, but less transparent: interest groups are 
capable of steering government to favor their narrow interests at the expense of diffuse citizens and the broad public 
interest.  In this Article we argue that this ‘capture’ characteristically results in anticompetitive regulatory measures 
that inflate the prices of products and services above their competitive market price or reduce their quality.  Such 
measures transfer wealth from the many to the few, as they diminish the value of diffuse citizens’ disposable income 
in terms of purchasing power.  We propose to conceive of this loss as a potentially unconstitutional taking of the 
diffuse citizens’ property.  Our account challenges the Madisonian assumption, embedded in the Constitution, that 
constitutions must protect the property rights of the propertied minority against the tyranny of the deprived majority.  
We argue that the Constitution must also limit another type of taking, effected when a minority solicits 
anticompetitive government measures that diminish the value of the disposable income of the marginalized majority.  
Accordingly, anticompetitive regulation catering to special interests will be deemed prima facie unconstitutional 
unless it is necessary to promote public purposes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion 
that individual rights and liberties ought to be protected against the tyranny 
of the majority.  James Madison, who viewed the protection of property as a 
key object of republican government,1 was ostensibly guided by a concern 
that majoritarian rule will systematically fail to protect the interests of the 
propertied minority.  Madison cautioned that, while questions of public 
policy must be determined by the will of the majority, the “majority may 
trespass on the rights of the minority,”2 and stressed that “[i]n all cases where 
a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the 
minority are in danger.”3 
However, studies in interest group theory4 teach us that the democratic 
political process suffers from another systemic weakness which may be no 
less pernicious, no less ubiquitous, but less transparent than the majoritarian 
failure that Madison had anticipated.  As interest group theory has exposed, 
the diffuse public is limited in its capacity to affect public decisions through 
the public political process, while concentrated interest groups possess an 
unequaled ability to ‘capture’ lawmakers and regulators and steer them to 
shape public policy that favors narrow special interests at the expense of the 
broad public interest.5  Therefore, contrary to Madison’s view, in the 
ubiquitous cases where a minority is united by a common interest or passion, 
the rights of the majority are likely to be in danger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 16 (1990). 
 2 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), 
reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES 
MADISON 7, 9–10 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973). 
 3 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 4 Interest group theory “seeks to explain governmental behavior on the basis of the costs of organizing 
interest groups in order to seek wealth transfers through the aegis of the state.”  Robert B. Ekelund 
& Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory of Government, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC 
CHOICE ch.17 (William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini eds., 2001). 
 5 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 7 (1965). 
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The takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is aligned with the 
spirit of Madison’s counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional 
property rights, focusing on the taking of private property of one or a few 
owners for the pursuit of a public interest.6  The Court has long held that the 
purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.”7  Considering the lessons of interest group 
theory, this Article argues that the constitutional protection of private 
property should sometimes serve the opposite purpose—namely, to bar 
government from unjustly imposing economic injuries on the public in the 
pursuit of special interests.  
This contention, if correct, should lead us to reexamine what kinds of 
private interests ought to be conceptualized as amounting to constitutionally 
protected property rights, and when and how government measures 
imposing burdens on those rights ought to pass judicial muster for their 
constitutionality.  The Article proposes such a reconceptualization, arguing 
that anticompetitive government measures that are motivated by special 
interests’ capture should be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional 
takings of diffuse citizens’ private property.8  Such measures tend to result in 
massive transfers of wealth from the many to the few, allowing interest groups 
to reap increased profits while diminishing the disposable income of the 
diffuse majority, in terms of its purchasing power (i.e., the quantity and 
quality of products and services that can be purchased with a unit of 
currency).  The Article suggests that the value of disposable income, in terms 
of purchasing power, must be conceived as constitutionally protected 
property, and that anticompetitive government measures that diminish it to 
the benefit of special interests should be conceptualized as effecting its 
unconstitutional taking if they are not justified as necessary to promote a 
public purpose.  Furthermore, it suggests that such a conceptualization 
should give rise to judicial review that could effectively preempt the adverse 
influences of special interest groups on government.  
 
 6 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 842 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) (discussing 
the use of eminent domain to take property for the general benefit of the public). 
 7 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed 
the ‘Armstrong principle’ since the case was decided.  William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong 
Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1153–54 
(1997).  
 8 For examples of such anticompetitive government measures, see infra notes 18–29 and 
accompanying text. 
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Other scholars have suggested that interest group theory justifies and 
makes desirable rigorous judicial review.  Among others, Erwin Chemerinsky 
suggested that the executive and legislative branches’ proneness to capture 
warrants rigorous judicial review,9 and Cass Sunstein argued that the courts 
should invalidate legislation that benefits certain groups resulting solely from 
their exercise of raw political power.10  The novelty in this approach is that 
the Article, for the first time, gives a name to a specific type of ubiquitous, if 
inconspicuous, type of government-imposed wealth transfer that caters to 
special interests at the expense of the diffuse public, thus bringing it under 
the framework of the constitutional protection of private property and 
thereby justifying rigorous judicial scrutiny of its manifestations.  The 
conception of individuals belonging to the diffuse public as bearers of rights, 
protecting them against the taking of their private property by 
anticompetitive regulation, provides these individuals with standing to 
demand judicial review, a mechanism that could assist them in overcoming 
the debilitating collective action problem that they face.  
This innovation adds constitutional underpinnings to those antitrust 
scholars who suggested applying federal antitrust law to anticompetitive 
government measures.11  However, we believe that constitutional law is the 
appropriate framework to address such measures as they pertain to the 
systemic failures of the democratic process.  Constitutional protection is 
required to limit the discretion of legislators who define the scope of antitrust 
law as they actively seek to attract special interests.     
 
 9 Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44, 46–47, 78, 80–81 
(1989). 
 10 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (1984).  On the need 
for rigorous judicial review in light of interest-group capture, see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 281–82 (1980) (noting the disproportionate 
power of statutes that consider special interests over general public concerns); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 874–75 (1980) 
(noting the likely failure of legislative bodies to successfully combat interest-group capture).  See 
generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985) (laying out the conflict between public and private law as it relates to the expansion 
of state power and original constitutional construction).   
 11 See, e.g., John Sherpard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 747 
(1986) (“Just as state and local regulations protected by federal antitrust exemption should escape 
preemption, so state and local regulations logically remain vulnerable to preemption if they 
implicate but extend further than the subject of a federal antitrust exemption.”); see also William H. 
Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exception 
After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1137 (1981) (“[T]he Court should recognize 
antitrust failure as a plausible basis for permissive regulation.”). 
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the problem of 
anticompetitive government measures designed to favor special interest 
groups at the expense of the diffuse public.  Part II provides the justification 
for conceptualizing anticompetitive government measures as potentially 
unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizen’s property: Section A establishes 
that such measures could be seen as government-imposed transfers of wealth 
which diminish the property of the diffuse public; and Section B argues that, 
in contrast with other conceivable types of government-imposed wealth 
transfers, anticompetitive government measures are worthy of rigorous 
judicial scrutiny, as the vulnerability of diffuse citizens to the systemic failures 
of the political process merits constitutional protection of their property 
interests.  This justification is based on the contention that the constitutional 
protection of private property is designed to protect owners against purely 
private wealth transfers caused by the systemic failures of the democratic 
process. The Article argues that this contention is supported by the original 
understanding of the constitutional protection of private property, which was 
guided by the Framers’ concerns about a political majority abusing its power 
against the propertied minority.  Part III will propose and discuss a 
framework for constitutional protection of the diffuse public’s property as 
well as the appropriate tests for judicial review of anticompetitive 
government measures.  The Article then suggests that such measures should 
be invalidated if they result from special-interest influence and are not 
necessary to promote their purported public purpose.  The Article then 
concludes.  
I.  INTEREST GROUP THEORY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT 
MEASURES 
Economic regulation is inescapably involved in allocating and 
reallocating burdens and entitlements across society.  Some allocative effects 
are caused by direct physical interference with economic interests, such as 
the physical taking of private land for public use, while others are caused by 
indirect interference with economic interests through regulation and macro-
economic policy.  Low exchange rates may serve the interests of exporters at 
the expense of importers; decreasing the corporate tax rate may serve the 
interests of businesses while harming the interests of those favored by 
extensive public services; some regulations may serve broad public interests 
in health and safety while imposing high compliance costs on businesses; and 
some regulations may limit commercial competition placing increased costs 
on consumers. 
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Under a traditional account of government regulation, such allocative 
effects are the product of policy choices aimed at pursuing public interests 
determined by the democratic political process and public-spirited 
lawmakers and state executives.  However, while this account may serve as a 
fair normative theory of how government ought to function, studies in 
interest group theory suggest that it fails as a positive account of the actual 
behavior of lawmakers and state executives.  Under the public choice 
account of regulation, policymakers are seen as self-interested agents that are 
often incentivized to be more responsive to narrow special-interest groups 
than to the broad public.  As George Stigler suggested, that is because groups 
that stand to win or lose the most from government action are incentivized 
to make the greatest effort to ‘capture’ policymakers and regulators in order 
to ensure that regulation serves their narrow interests.12  
Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action13 provided the explanation for 
why Stigler’s findings could be generalized: smaller groups are more likely to 
succeed at shaping favorable public policies by capturing policymakers, at 
the expense of the larger groups that try to shape policy through the political 
system.14  Olson demonstrated that the problem of collective action arises 
when large groups attempt to produce a public good that will be accessible 
to all of its members.  That is because individual members of the group, being 
rational and intent on pursuing their self-interest, will seek to enjoy the fruits 
of the joint enterprise at the lowest possible investment of their own personal 
resources.  The larger and more homogenous the group is, the less its 
members are incentivized to contribute to the joint enterprise, as they are 
aware that if other members succeed in bringing about the desired result, 
they would be able to reap the benefits while avoiding the costs.  In contrast, 
when a concentrated interest group attempts to promote a shared interest 
 
 12 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (arguing 
that regulation often reflects the interests of the regulated who control the regulatory process).  See 
generally MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
(Greenwood Press 1977) (1955) (providing an early account of the tendency of administrative 
agencies to protect the industries they regulate and define the public interest according to the 
interest of the regulated); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900–1916 (1963) (arguing that the progressive 
federal regulations of the early twentieth century, purportedly aimed to serve the public interest, 
were in fact designed to favor business interests).  
 13 OLSON, supra note 5.  
 14 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (using game theory to elaborate on the 
likelihood of overcoming prisoners’ dilemma situations); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF 
COOPERATION (1987) (same); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & 
ECON. 211 (1976) (generalizing Stigler’s theory of regulation and establishing diminishing returns 
to group size in using the political process to obtain wealth transfers). 
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that would produce benefits accessible only to its members, it will succeed in 
overcoming the collective action problem.  Individual members of the group 
would be sufficiently incentivized to invest resources in the joint enterprise, 
as the reward would be more valuable per capita, and the small size of the 
group would reduce the costs of monitoring and imposing sanctions on 
members who do not contribute to the effort. 
Members of the diffuse public face a collective action problem when they 
seek to shape public policies or merely to obtain information on public 
decisions affecting their interests.15  Because members of the broad public 
make up a large and diffuse group, they have a low per capita incentive to 
invest resources in collecting information on public decisions, and much less 
so to invest time in active participation in the public political process.  As 
Anthony Downs observed, the resulting information gaps between voters and 
representatives is the primary problem in representative democracy.16  
Generally speaking, diffuse voters are not familiar with the processes of 
public decision-making and with particular decisions affecting their interests, 
nor are they capable of assessing the reasons and justifications behind 
particular decisions.  At the same time, concentrated interest groups are 
uniquely capable of overcoming the same collective action problem, due to 
their small size and particular interests.  They can thus take advantage of the 
information gaps between the broad public and its representatives, 
exacerbate those gaps by influencing the media, and effectively invest 
resources in lobbying, campaign finance, or other forms of support or 
retaliation that may impel decision-makers to sway public decisions in their 
favor.17  
By capturing public decision-makers, interest groups regularly shape 
regulations and macro-economic policies that restrain existing or potential 
competition.  They can steer policymakers to impose restrictions on 
international or interstate trade,18 establish licensing regimes or other rules 
 
 15 Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809, 
811–12 (1998) (“[S]pecial interests prevail because they are better able to monitor the incumbent's 
activities than are diffuse interests.”). 
 16 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 247 (1957) . 
 17 This understanding was further developed by Elinor Ostrom, who identified actors that collectively 
have exclusive access to certain “common pool resources” as having a strong incentive to cooperate 
in managing those resources.  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  
 18 A large body of political economy literature explains restrictions on international trade by reference 
to the demands of domestic interest groups seeking protection. See, e.g., Sean D. Ehrlich, The Tariff 
and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 427, 
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that limit or impose high market-entry costs,19 limit the quantity of output or 
set the prices of certain goods,20 enact rules that allow competitors to 
coordinate prices,21 or enact legislation exempting certain industries from 
antitrust laws.22  Such measures artificially increase the market power of 
interest groups and allow them to engage in monopolistic behavior, charging 
supra-competitive prices or reducing the quality of the goods and services 
that they produce or trade.  These, in turn, result in massive transfers of 
wealth from the many to the few, by increasing profits for the favored interest 
groups and reducing the value of the disposable income of diffuse citizens in 
terms of purchasing power. 
Cases of public restraints of competition influenced by special interests 
are very common and well documented: Gabriel Kolko argued in 1963 that 
federal regulation between 1900–1916, which was commonly seen as 
pursuing public progressive interests, was to a great extent influenced by 
business interests in curbing competition;23 a study by Ralph Nader 
published in 1973 found extensive anticompetitive effects of federal 
regulation in the fields of communication, energy, transportation, and 
others;24 in his seminal work describing the economic theory of regulation, 
George Stigler exposed the ways in which the interest group of railroad 
companies used state authority to preempt competition from truck drivers in 
the early 1930s;25 in 1980, Congress passed legislation authorizing certain 
vertical restraints on competition in the soft drink industry, influenced by soft 
drink bottlers such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo who sought immunity from 
antitrust law in response to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) litigation 
 
427–445 (2008) (linking shifts in U.S. trade policy to institutional change that decreased interest 
group access to decision makers). 
 19 See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002). 
 20 For example, at issue in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), was a California state law designed to 
establish artificially high market prices for California raisin growers by permitting them to fix prices 
and restrict output.  See Roger C. Simmons & John R. Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust 
Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 61, 62–63 (1974). 
 21 For example, a California statute authorized price-setting by wine producers and wholesalers.  See 
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
 22 For example, in 1980, Congress passed legislation exempting anticompetitive practices in the soft-
drink industry from antitrust law in response to the demands of soft-drink firms.  See infra note 26. 
 23 KOLKO, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
 24 THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND 
COMPETITION 35, 103, 193, 227, 319 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973). 
 25 Stigler, supra note 12, at 8. 
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against them;26 in the early 2000s, auto dealers succeeded in restraining 
competition by attaining legislation in all fifty states prohibiting direct vehicle 
sales by manufacturers and online sellers without a franchise presence,27 and 
real estate brokers successfully lobbied for state laws and regulations 
restricting price competition by barring real estate professionals from offering 
limited brokerage services for lower fees instead of full package services;28 in 
2003, the pharmaceutical industry invested $116 million in convincing 
Congress to ban Medicare from negotiating for lower drug prices, resulting 
in an estimated transfer of $90 billion per year from consumers to the 
pharmaceutical industry.29  To be sure, these are only a few representative 
examples. 
Extant law exacerbates the problem of anticompetitive government 
measures because it immunizes public competition restraints, and private 
parties acting in accordance with them, from antitrust law, leaving no legal 
tools at the hands of consumers or competitors that could be used to 
challenge measures detrimental to their interests.  Several Supreme Court 
decisions have affirmed that federal regulations prevail when conflicting with 
antitrust law,30 and the antitrust “state action doctrine,” first established in 
the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,31 holds that the Sherman Act does not apply 
to competition restraints produced by official state action, provided that they 
are part of a ‘clearly articulated’ state policy and are actively supervised by 
the state.32  The Parker doctrine is based on principles of state sovereignty and 
federalism: in the Parker decision, the Court found there is “nothing in the 
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose 
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its 
 
 26 SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, A.B.A., MONOGRAPH 24, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS 
FROM ANTITRUST LAW 49–50 (2007); Leonard R. Stein, Note, The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition 
Act of 1980: Antitrust Loses Its Fizz, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 91, 91–92 (1981). 
 27 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Fordham Annual Conference 
on International Antitrust Law & Policy: State Intervention/State Action—a U.S. Perspective (Oct. 
24, 2003). 
 28 Letter from Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, & R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Matt Blunt, Governor, State of Mo. (May 23, 
2005); Letter from Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, & R. Hewitt Pate, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Loretta R. DeHay, Gen. Counsel, 
Tex. Real Estate Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2005). 
 29 TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 56 (2018). 
 30 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004). 
 31 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).   
 32 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
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legislature”;33 in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court 
reasoned that “[t]he rationale of Parker was that, in light of our national 
commitment to federalism, the general language of the Sherman Act should 
not be interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their 
governmental capacities as sovereign regulators.”34  
Besides the Parker doctrine, the corollary Noerr-Pennington35 doctrine holds 
that “the federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private 
individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.”36  The 
doctrine, based on the premise that antitrust laws may not impinge upon 
First Amendment rights to petition government, exempts private parties 
from antitrust liability even if they seek anticompetitive government 
measures with anticompetitive intent or by wrongful conduct.37 
The immunity government measures could confer upon interest groups 
wishing to engage in anticompetitive practices makes such measures all the 
more valuable for interest groups and increases their incentive to influence 
government.  Former Chairman of the FTC, Timothy Muris, stated: 
Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying 
to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel.  A 
system that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government 
regulation to fix prices legal, has not completely addressed the competitive 
problem.  It has simply dictated the form that the problem will take.38 
Interestingly, the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines could help 
demonstrate why federal antitrust law is ill fitted to address the problem of 
anticompetitive government measures, not just as a matter of law, but also as 
a matter of legal theory.  As the Supreme Court once stated, “Parker and Noerr 
are complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws 
regulate business, not politics.”39  Indeed, rather than antitrust laws, 
anticompetitive government measures aimed to favor interest groups ought 
to be addressed by constitutional law, a body of law precisely intended to 
 
 33 Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51. 
 34 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991). 
 35 United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). 
 36 Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 379–80. 
 37 Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Noerr-Pennington immunity 
applies to any concerted effort to sway public officials regardless of the private citizen’s 
intent.”); Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cty. Memorial Hosp., 185 F.3d 154, 162 (3rd 
Cir. 1999) (stating that the remedy for bribery, fraud, or deceit lies with laws that forbid such 
conduct, and cannot be premised on willingness of courts to look behind state action in context of 
antitrust litigation). 
 38 Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 170 (2005). 
 39 Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 383. 
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regulate politics.  The addressed problem raises essentially constitutional 
questions concerning the failures of the political decision-making process and 
the normative constraints on the legitimate use of government power to 
transfer wealth between groups and individuals. 
The issue at hand is constitutional in another important sense.  As Tim 
Wu argues in his recent book, antitrust law plays a “constitutional” role as it 
was originally aimed to achieve a political goal alongside its economic goal.  
According to Wu, antitrust was serving as “a check on private power, by 
preventing the growth of monopoly corporations into something that might 
transcend the power of elected government to control.”40  Wu turns our 
attention to the fact that the collective action problem, allowing concentrated 
interest groups to dominate the diffuse public in obtaining favorable public 
policy in the first place, is made worse by restraints on competition: as 
industries become more concentrated they can overcome their collective 
action problem more easily as fewer players can benefit from reduced 
coordination costs and increased benefits from the spoils of the desired 
political outcome.41  Interest groups could thus use their disproportionate 
political power to restrain competition, which in turn further increases their 
political power, in a vicious cycle that corrupts the political process and 
perpetuates the control of private power over public policy. 
In what follows, this Article proposes a response to this problem.  It argues 
that such ‘captured’ government measures should be reconceptualized as 
potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens’ private property if they 
are not justified as necessary to accomplish their purported public purposes.  
II. CONCEPTUALIZING ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT MEASURES AS 
POTENTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
At the outset, the proposition that anticompetitive government measures 
can be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of citizens’ 
private property may seem questionable.  We are accustomed to regard 
constitutional rights as counter-majoritarian constraints on government 
action, shielding individuals and minorities, and not the broad public, from 
unjust burdens.  At the same time, we tend to view economic competition as 
the subject of antitrust law that is designed to ensure aggregate economic 
 
 40 WU, supra note 29, at 54 (italics omitted). 
 41 Id. at 58. 
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efficiency and aggregate consumer welfare rather than the protection of 
individual rights.42 
However, this Part argues that anticompetitive government measures 
could and should be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of 
citizens’ private property.  This justification is based on the contention that 
the constitutional protection of private property is designed to protect owners 
against purely private wealth transfers caused by the systemic failures of the 
democratic process.  Section A establishes that anticompetitive government 
measures designed to favor special-interest groups could be seen as 
government-imposed transfers of wealth that enrich interest groups while 
diminishing the property of the diffuse majority.  Section B then explains 
that, in contrast with other conceivable types of government-imposed wealth 
transfers, anticompetitive government measures that transfer wealth from 
the many to the few by exploiting the political vulnerability of diffuse citizens 
are worthy of rigorous constitutional scrutiny.  Support for this argument 
could also be found in the vision of the Framers of the Constitution, whose 
concerns with the failures of the political process led them to delineate the 
types of private property interests that the Takings Clause should protect. 
A.  Anticompetitive Government Measures as Wealth Transfers that Diminish the 
Property of the Diffuse Majority 
Government restraints on competition often result in above-market 
prices or below-market quality of affected goods or services.  Subsequent to 
such measures, the diffuse group of consumers will experience a diminution 
of the value of their disposable income in terms of purchasing power—their 
earnings will now allow them to purchase less in quantity or quality of the 
same goods or services they could access before the measures.  At the same 
time, the interest groups favored by anticompetitive measures will reap 
monopoly profits at the expense of their consumers.  This Section aims to 
establish that it is possible to conceive of such effects as government-imposed 
wealth transfers that diminish the property of diffuse citizens.  
 
 
 
 42 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1987).  But see Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis 
of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2349, 2354 (2013) (offering a different view that conceives of the Sherman Act as protecting 
consumers’ property rights). 
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This contention raises a conceptual problem.  The distributive effect 
described above is not generated by a government action that directly 
expropriates wealth from diffuse citizens and allocates it to interest groups, 
but rather by the indirect modification of market prices.  Since competitive 
market prices are determined by transactions between willing buyers and 
sellers in voluntary market transactions, these prices may be viewed as 
external to the property rights of the parties.  While it is true that the currency 
held by the diffuse citizens is indeed their private property, it would be 
problematic to suggest that this property right includes an entitlement to 
exchange some particular amount of their currency in return for a given 
good.  From this perspective, anticompetitive government measures cannot 
be seen as diminishing private property, and they can hardly be seen as 
government-imposed wealth transfers, since their distributive effects reflect 
nothing more than the terms of voluntary transactions between private 
parties.43  
However, the notion that market prices are determined by willing buyers 
and sellers alone serves to obscure the role played by government in affecting 
prices by defining and enforcing property rights and regulating market 
activity.  Such government actions are involved in determining market prices 
either by setting them directly or by modifying supply and demand or the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties.  Anticompetitive government 
measures, by definition, affect deviations from the market prices that would 
be determined by competitive conditions.  These measures restrict the 
purchasing options of consumers, granting interest groups the power to 
artificially inflate prices beyond the level buyers and sellers on an equal 
footing of bargaining power would have agreed to.  Such measures, despite 
their indirect nature, have clear distributive implications.  Such implications 
are essentially no different from those of measures that directly take 
consumers’ money and allocate them to interest groups.  
Correspondingly, the diminution of the value of money in terms of 
purchasing power is conceptually equivalent to the expropriation of money.  
That is because the money held by citizens is essentially a carrier of 
purchasing power.  For example, if a citizen possesses $100, there is no 
difference between directly taking $20 away from them or creating an 
uncompetitive market that inflates the price tag of products such that $100 
would allow them to purchase no more in quantity and quality of goods than 
$80 could purchase beforehand.  Money, in contrast with other types of 
 
 43 This argument may be raised only with regards to anticompetitive government measures that do 
not directly set prices. 
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possessions, carries no independent value to its owners that cannot be 
reduced to its exchange value—the value of goods and services it could be 
exchanged for in the market.  Therefore, if physical taking of money is an 
infringement of property, so is the diminution of its value in terms of 
purchasing power by artificially inflated prices. 
The contention that the right to property in money includes the 
protection of its value could be found in comparative constitutional law.  For 
example, Hans-Jürgen Papier, a former President of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, argued in 1973 that the guarantee of property found 
in Article 14 of the German Basic Law includes the protection of the value 
of money against changes in monetary policy, precisely because money is 
essentially a carrier of purchasing power.44  This wide-ranging argument was 
later rejected by the German Constitutional Court, given the impossibility of 
requiring the state to guarantee the value of money against the numerous 
factors that shape it.45  However, that decision is regarded as compatible with 
the view that the protection of property under the German Constitution 
extends to the state’s responsibility to guarantee the value of money by, inter-
alia, maintaining a ‘functioning monetary order’ and institutionalizing the 
independence of the central bank, as well as its mandate to ensure price 
stability.46  To be sure, the question of whether monetary phenomena such 
as inflation or currency devaluation could be seen as infringements of 
property rights is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article, which focuses 
on the effect of anticompetitive government measures on the property rights 
of the diffuse public.  
This understanding of the relationship between anticompetitive prices 
and diminution of property value could also be found in U.S. jurisprudence.  
In the case of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme Court found that “[a] 
consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust 
violation has been injured ‘in his . . . property’ within the meaning of § 4 [of 
 
 44 Hans-Jürgen Papier, Eigentumsgarantie und Geldentwertung, 98 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 
528, 530 (1973) (arguing that the constitutional protection of property must take into account the 
social and economic function of money as the carrier of purchasing power, which is of central 
relevance for individual development. Hence, the value of money must be included in the scope of 
the protection of property found in Article 14 of the German Basic Law). 
 45 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 31, 1998, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 97, 350 (Ger.).; Isabel 
Feichtner, Public Law’s Rationalization of the Legal Architecture of Money: What Might Legal Analysis of Money 
Become?, 17 GERMAN L.J. 875, 886–87 (2016) (finding that the value of money cannot be guaranteed 
by the state due to its dependency on multiple factors such as prices, wages, and interest rates). 
 46 Feichtner, supra note 45, at 887. 
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the Clayton Act],”47 which provides that persons injured in their “business 
or property” by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue for treble 
damages.48  The Court found that a consumer acquiring goods or services 
for personal use “is injured in ‘property’ when the price of those goods or 
services is artificially inflated by reason of the anticompetitive conduct 
complained of.”49  While the Reiter decision recognizes injuries to property 
due to inflated prices caused by private competition restraints, there is no 
reason why the same should not hold true in the case of public competition 
restraints.  
B.  Constitutional Protection of Property as a Response to Purely Private Wealth 
Transfers Effected by the Systemic Failures of the Political Process 
So far, this Article has established that anticompetitive government 
measures could be seen as effecting government-imposed wealth transfers 
that diminish the property of diffuse citizens.  However, it does not simply 
follow from this conception that such measures should be considered 
potentially unconstitutional.  After all, many evidently permissible 
government measures have profound redistributive implications.  For 
example, government may progressively or regressively levy taxes and 
redistribute resources through spending, it may adopt zoning ordinances or 
generate public projects that affect the market value of private property, and 
it may enact labor and consumer protection laws that redistributes wealth by 
modifying the relative bargaining powers of private parties.50  While the 
Court recognized that government measures indirectly diminishing the value 
of private property may sometimes be considered compensable takings,51 the 
‘regulatory takings’ doctrine is very limited in its application.52  As the 
Supreme Court explained when discussing the limits of mandating 
compensation for regulatory takings, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to 
 
 47 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
 48 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2017). 
 49 Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339. 
 50 See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 51 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[I]f a regulation goes too far, it will 
be recognized as a taking”).  The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of regulatory takings 
further in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 178–79 (1979); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); and Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–42 (2005). 
 52 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (declining to set a bright-line test of when regulation diminishing private 
property goes “too far” but determining that compensation is due for the very limited category of 
regulations that deny property owners “all economically beneficial or productive use of land”). 
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some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.”53 
This Section argues that, in contrast with other government measures 
that effect wealth transfers, anticompetitive measures are worthy of rigorous 
judicial scrutiny due to their propensity to violate a normative principle at 
the heart of the constitutional protection of private property—namely, that 
government actions that transfer wealth between persons in society ought to 
promote, or be aimed to promote, a public purpose rather than purely 
private ends.  As will be explained, anticompetitive measures are prone to 
violate this principle because the property interests of the diffuse majority are 
susceptible to be harmed by a systemic failure of the political decision-making 
process—the interest-group capture failure. 
The constitutional protection of private property is arguably designed to 
uphold two important normative limitations constraining the legitimate use 
of government power to enrich some at the expense of others.  First, in the 
event that a government measure pursuing a public purpose diminishes 
private property, the Takings Clause may require government to 
compensate the aggrieved parties such that the burdens of the public 
measure be “borne by the public as a whole” rather than by “some people 
alone.”54  Second, and important for this analysis, the Takings Clause is 
aimed to bar government from effecting purely private wealth transfers, 
requiring the confiscating or diminishing measure to be aimed at pursuing 
public rather than purely private ends.55  According to Cass Sunstein, a 
central theme of the Constitution, and the Takings Clause in particular, is 
the prohibition of what he terms “naked preferences”—the use of 
government power to distribute resources to a certain group solely due to the 
group’s capability of exercising “raw political power.”56  As Sunstein writes 
with regards to the Takings Clause: 
A principal theme of the eminent domain clause cases is that government 
action cannot be used to serve purely private ends.  Taking property from A 
in order to benefit B is the core example.  The text of the clause attests to 
 
 53 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.  
 54 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 55 The prohibition of purely private wealth transfers is found in the ‘public use’ requirement of the 
Takings Clause: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that “one person’s 
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public 
purpose, even though compensation be paid.”  Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 
55, 80 (1937). 
 56 Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1689. 
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this theme in the basic requirement that a ‘public use’ be shown before a 
taking is permitted, even with compensation.  The function of this 
requirement is to prevent purely private wealth transfers.57  
This Article contends that anticompetitive government measures are 
especially prone to reflect the “naked preferences” of special-interest groups 
that are able to exercise their superior political influence to obtain the 
measures, allowing them to reap monopoly profits at the expense of the 
diffuse public.  Due to their collective action problem, members of the diffuse 
public are incapable of exerting countervailing political influence, or even 
becoming aware of the measures and their distributive implications.  In light 
of that, anticompetitive measures are suspect of effecting wealth transfers that 
are aimed to serve the private ends of favored interest groups rather than 
their purported public ends.  Rigorous scrutiny of anticompetitive measures 
under the constitutional protection of property is therefore warranted, as the 
diffuse public’s property interest in the purchasing power of their disposable 
income is especially susceptible to injury by the systemic capture failures of 
the public decision-making process.  Part III outlines the contours of a 
judicial test that could be used to scrutinize anticompetitive government 
measures under this framework.  Due to the impracticality and arguable 
undesirability of substantive judicial review of the measures’ purported 
public purposes, the proposed test focuses on scrutinizing the process that led 
to their adoption as well as the government’s choice of means. 
This argument in favor of rigorous judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive 
government measures relies on the contention that the private property 
interests that require judicially enforced constitutional protection are those 
most susceptible to be taken by purely private wealth transfers produced by 
the systemic failures of the public decision-making process.  The remainder 
of this Part aims to show that this contention is nothing new.  It argues that 
the constitutional protection of private property was originally designed to 
respond to systemic failures of the political market.  
When James Madison, who initially proposed the Takings Clause, called 
for the constitutional protection of property and distinguished the types of 
property interests that warrant heightened constitutional protection, he was 
arguably motivated by the need to preempt private wealth transfers which 
he believed would be produced by another type of political market failure—
namely, the tyranny of the majority.58  The opposite and no less pernicious 
 
 57 Id. at 1724. 
 58 See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.  
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political failure—what may be termed the tyranny of the minority—was 
apparently not as visible at that moment. 
Madison’s concern with government infringement on private property 
was tied to his concern with the dangers of partial, self-interested legislation, 
aimed to favor one interest at the expense of others.  Madison’s republican 
ideal of a government pursuing the public good and refraining from partiality 
to one interest or the other,59 ostensibly guided his thought on the relation 
between government action and private property.  According to Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Madison believed that “[t]ax policies and economic regulation 
might have some redistributive consequences, but it should not be their 
objective to benefit some at the expense of others.  That was the sort of partial 
self-interested legislation to be avoided.”60  Recognizing that division into 
different “sects, factions and interests” is a feature of civilized society, 
Madison was weary of such “unjust laws,” cautioning that under democratic 
forms of government “[d]ebtors have defrauded their creditors.  The landed 
interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest.  The [h]olders of one 
species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of 
another species.”61  
As his words suggest, Madison’s perception of the dangers of partial and 
interested public action affecting private property were not limited only to 
physical dispossession of physical property.  Madison’s political philosophy 
exhibited a much broader conception of private property which also 
acknowledged indirect diminutions of value as violations of property rights.  
For example, in 1786, he argued that paper money “[a]ffects rights of 
property as much as taking away equal value in land; [and] affects property 
without trial by [j]ury.”62  As Nedelsky writes:  
Madison did not . . . have a simple conception of property as land or 
even material goods.  The ‘faculties of acquiring property’ [the protection of 
which was, according to Federalist Ten, the first object of government] 
emphasized a subtle, nonmaterial dimension of property.  And the legislative 
injustice he feared was not straightforward confiscation, but the more 
indirect infringements inherent in paper money and debtor relief law.  Those 
 
 59 See NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing Madison’s view that the government could 
accomplish its supreme objective of promoting the public good only if it refrained from being partial 
to any specific group’s interest).   
 60 Id. at 31.  
 61 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135–36. 
 62 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia House of Delegates: Against Paper Money (Nov. 1786), in 
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 279, 280 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
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interferences . . . were both more likely and more invidious because they 
were less overt violations of property.63 
Furthermore, as Michael Treanor demonstrates, Madison viewed the 
constitutional protection of private property as serving a hortatory function, 
expressing a principle broader than the application of its legal protection, 
which he believed government ought to adhere to—namely, that 
government should abstain from “unjustly” burdening private economic 
interests, even indirectly.64 
However, when Madison set out to include the protection against 
uncompensated government takings of private property in the Constitution, 
he ostensibly intended to limit its application only to physical dispossession 
of physical property interests, and not to indirect diminution, by government 
regulation and taxation, of numerous other economic interests of private 
parties.65  An important question could therefore be raised: If Madison’s 
perception of the dangers of interested government infringements on private 
property was so broad, why did he choose to constitutionally protect only 
physical property interests against physical dispossessions? 
The answer could arguably be found in Madison’s concerns relating to a 
particular failure of the political process—namely, the majoritarian failure.  
According to Treanor, Madison’s writings and speeches indicate that “he 
believed that physical property needed greater protection than other forms 
of property because its owners were peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian 
decisionmaking [sic.].”66  Madison held that, in general, the procedural and 
institutional checks and balances provided by federalism were adequate to 
protect most property interests.67  For instance he wrote that: 
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of 
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to 
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the 
same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county 
or district, than an entire State.68 
However, according to Treanor, Madison held that physical property 
interests required more than the procedural and structural protection that 
 
 63 NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 30. 
 64 See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 819, 840 (1995) (noting that Madison interpreted the Takings Clause to stand 
for the broad principle that the government should refrain taking any action that directly or 
indirectly diminished the value of private property).  
 65 Id. at 791–97. 
 66 Id. at 847. 
 67 Id. at 841–43. 
 68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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sufficed to mitigate the threats of government infringements on other forms 
of property.  Landed interests required heightened substantive protection 
against infringement because of a majoritarian failure in the political process.  
Holding that “[i]n all cases where a majority are united by a common interest 
or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger,”69 Madison believed that 
universal suffrage and demographic growth will favor the interests of 
manufacturers over the interests of landowners in majoritarian decision-
making.70  As he wrote: 
The three principal classes into which our citizens were divisible were the 
landed, the commercial, and the manufacturing . . . It is particularly requisite 
therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely 
to the care, or the impartiality of the third.71  
 Emphasis on protection against physical takings may also be aligned with 
the counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional protection in another 
important way.  Single government measures that physically take property 
tend to affect specific individuals such as those who happen to own particular 
plots of land, while indirect infringements by regulation and macro-
economic policy tend to affect much larger groups.  Thus, Madison may have 
held that the latter type of takings does not warrant a constitutional remedy, 
as he assumed that large groups would be sufficiently capable of protecting 
themselves against such takings through the regular mechanisms of 
representative government.    
More generally, it could be argued that protecting the minority of 
landowners from the landless masses was the underlying concern of the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution.  The installation of a complex and 
diversified system of government, supermajority amendment requirements, 
and a judicial review mechanism to protect constitutional rights responded 
to concerns that a landless majority would use its numerical superiority to 
redistribute property.72 Many contemporary legal scholars view the same 
majoritarian failure as the primary source of justification for judicial review.73  
Madison’s decision to grant landed individual interests special 
constitutional protection was thus ostensibly guided by a criterion focused on 
 
 69 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135. 
 70 Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1691; Treanor, supra note 64, at 850. 
 71 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 124. 
 72 See Madison, supra note 68 (discussing the political structures designed to curb such conflict of 
interests); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 73 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 6 (1980).  
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (conceptualizing the Court as a countermajoritarian institution, 
and hence seeking justification for judicial intervention against the wishes of the majority).  
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political process failure.  Madison believed that the primary defect of 
republican government is the majoritarian failure, and that landed and 
physical interests are particularly susceptible to be injured by it.  He therefore 
held that these property interests ought to be protected by an institution that 
is insulated from the majoritarian failures—namely, judicially enforced 
constitutional property rights.  He presumed that the broad public whose 
property interests could be affected indirectly by government measures was 
capable of effectively securing its interests through the system of 
representative government and the structural protections of federalism.  
However, Madison apparently did not anticipate the severe systemic 
failure of interest-group capture, that enables interest groups to shape public 
policy that benefits their commercial interests to the detriment of the broad 
unorganized public.74  Interestingly, Madison seems to have become more 
aware of this failure at a later period, in light of developments related to 
Alexander Hamilton’s economic plans in the 1790s.  According to Nedelsky, 
At the time of the convention, Madison devoted almost no attention to the 
potential threat of the wealthy using their power to promote their own unjust 
plans. . . .  He thought Hamilton’s plans for redemption of public securities 
would unjustly favor wealthy speculators.  And he not only opposed 
Hamilton’s plan for the bank as unconstitutional, he was appalled at the 
spectacle of men within the government deriving personal gain from 
governmental measures, and the wealthy successfully exerting pressure from 
without.75 
Accordingly, we argue that in light of the political market-failure of 
interest-group capture, the property interests of the diffuse citizens are no less 
susceptible to injury by interested public decisions than the property interests 
of the minority of landowners are susceptible to injury by majoritarian public 
decisions.  Therefore, both types of property interests require the protection 
of constitutional property rights enforced by courts, which are not only 
insulated from the majoritarian failure, but are also insulated from interest-
group influence to a greater extent than the political branches of 
government.  As Richard Posner noted, judges are better shielded from the 
pressures of special interests, as they have life tenure, fixed salaries, and 
procedural rules that limit their contact with interest groups.76   
 
 74 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 269 (1994) (describing the ability of smaller interest groups to 
influence public policy such that it benefits their commercial interests to the detriment of the public 
as ‘minoritarian bias’). 
 75 NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 44. 
 76 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 501 (9th ed. 2014). 
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Anticompetitive government measures therefore ought to be conceived 
as potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens’ private property, as 
they may be aimed to effect purely private wealth transfers rather than to 
promote public ends.  Part III outlines a judicial test that could be used to 
scrutinize and possibly invalidate anticompetitive government measures if 
they are not justified as necessary to promoting their purported public 
purposes.  
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR PROTECTING THE MAJORITY’S 
PROPERTY AGAINST ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT MEASURES 
This Part outlines a framework for constitutional protection against 
purely private wealth transfers effected by anticompetitive government 
measures and discusses its practical desirability.  It suggests that 
anticompetitive measures should be invalidated if special-interest influence 
could be found to be involved in their adoption, and if they are not necessary 
to promote their purported public purpose.  Accordingly, this Part presents 
a test for judicial scrutiny of suspect anti-competitive government measures.  
As established above, anticompetitive government measures are 
particularly suspect of being aimed at serving the private interests of special-
interest groups rather than a legitimate public purpose, due to a systemic 
failure of the political decision-making process.  They should therefore be 
scrutinized by the courts under the ‘public use’ requirement of the Takings 
Clause.  To explain how the proposed test was selected, this Part starts by 
discussing some straightforward alternatives.  
At first glance, it may be argued that establishing the influence of an 
interest group on the adoption of an anticompetitive measure should suffice 
in and of itself to conclude that the measure in question fails to meet the 
public use requirement. The fact of such influence arguably suggests that the 
measure is aimed to promote the ends of the private parties who lobbied for 
it rather than its purported public ends.  However, in order to discern when 
such measures should be seen as serving purely private ends, it is not enough 
to examine whether they were produced by the favored group’s political 
influence.  Rather, it is necessary to turn to normative standards that 
determine what purposes, and what conditions, may justify the distributive 
effects of the measure.  Einer Elhauge, in his criticism of the use of interest 
group theory to justify more intrusive judicial review,77 rightly argues that we 
 
 77 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 
48–49 (1991) (arguing that interest group theory can be misleading without an identifiable implicit 
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cannot distinguish between proper and improper interest-group influence 
without an independent normative baseline.  For example, Elhauge 
demonstrates that normative standards of social desirability are required in 
order to judge the legitimacy of the political influence of a racial minority 
seeking to obtain affirmative action policy which will favor its members at 
the expense of the members of the diffuse racial majority.78  Without a 
normative baseline, we cannot explain why some would view such political 
influence as legitimate while judging the influence of a wealthy minority 
seeking to prevent distributive public policy as illegitimate.  Therefore, the 
fact of special-interest influence on the adoption of a measure can only serve 
to justify a heightened level of scrutiny of the measure’s purported purpose, 
but not to render the measure unjustified as such. 
If so, to judge the permissibility of a particular anticompetitive measure 
under the public use requirement, we need to substantively examine whether 
it serves a public purpose.  One way to do so is to ask whether the expected 
benefits of the measure outweigh its harm to the diffuse public’s private 
property.  Such a comparison of costs and benefits was suggested by Frank 
Michelman’s economic analysis of the public use requirement.79  According 
to Michelman, if the measure’s benefits exceed its costs, including the costs 
of a hypothetical compensation scheme that would make the aggrieved 
parties indifferent to their loss, a court could determine that the measure 
meets the public use requirement.  If the costs exceed the benefits, however, 
a court could determine that the measure does not pursue a public purpose.80  
However, such a judicial test of public use is arguably impractical and 
undesirable.  First, we may cast doubt on the competency of courts to 
measure the costs and benefits associated with anticompetitive government 
measures.  Quantifying the loss incurred by consumers along with the 
efficiency losses associated with anticompetitive measures and weighing them 
against expected benefits, which may be intangible and speculative, would 
require broad economic policy analysis, an expertise that judges may not 
possess.  More importantly, such a comparison requires value judgments as 
to the worth of the measure’s purported benefits and the permissibility of 
imposing any certain amount of loss on private parties for the sake of their 
attainment.  These judgments must invoke and apply a conception of the 
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 79 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
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legitimate functions and ends of government, a task that today’s courts are 
reluctant to undertake.81 
Indeed, since the demise of the Lochner82 Era and its interpretation of 
“substantive due process,”83 a time when economic regulations, including 
minimum wage and child labor laws, were struck down as unconstitutional, 
the Supreme Court stressed that it does not “sit as a superlegislature to weigh 
the wisdom of legislation,”84 and held that legislative bodies should “have 
broad scope to experiment with economic problems.”85  The prevailing 
democratic theory holds that legislatures are the appropriate institution for 
the definition of the appropriate ends of government, and in the context of 
takings today’s courts are “exceedingly deferential to legislative definitions of 
a permissible public use.”86  As Justice Douglas held in the case of Berman v. 
Parker: “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive.”87 
Interestingly, it could be argued that the ghost of Lochner is part of the 
reason why the problem of anticompetitive government measures remains 
unaddressed by courts until this day.  The Parker decision that introduced the 
antitrust “state action doctrine” was a child of the post-Lochner and New Deal 
era, which exhibited greater judicial deference to state regulation.  Some 
have suggested that the doctrine “can be seen as a necessary concession to 
anticompetitive state regulation to avoid a return to the Lochner era.”88  Since 
then, lawyers such as Merrick Garland, now Chief Judge of the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, argued against the use of interest group 
theory to justify judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive economic regulation 
 
 81 Thomas W.  Merrill, Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66–68 (1986). 
 82 The period known in American legal history as the ‘Lochner Era’ is named after the case of Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 83 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a New York statute controlling the 
price of milk); see also W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (upholding a Washington 
statute establishing a minimum wage for women). 
 84 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). 
 85 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
 86 Merrill, supra note 81, at 63.  For a recent example of the deferential interpretation of the public 
use requirement, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (deferring to the city’s 
judgment about the need for the program in question). 
 87 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 88 James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Panel III: Antitrust and the Obama Administration: U.S. 
Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. 
L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2010). 
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under federal antitrust law, asserting that this would amount to a dangerous 
return to Lochnerism.89 
In light of, and in accord with, the prevailing deference of today’s courts 
to legislative determinations of permissible government ends, an alternative, 
and arguably more appropriate, framework that would allow judicial 
scrutiny of anticompetitive and arguably unconstitutional anticompetitive 
government measures under the Takings Clause must be found.  It is possible 
to formulate such a judicial test, one that takes the permissibility of a 
measure’s purported public purpose as given but does not abstain from 
ascertaining whether it is aimed to advance private rather than public ends.  
This Part draws upon Thomas Merrill’s suggestion that the public use 
requirement could be reinterpreted to allow courts to scrutinize 
government’s choice of means rather than the permissibility of the taking’s 
ends.90  Such a task is arguably more accurate and better suited to the 
institutional competency of courts, and hence more desirable under the 
prevalent theory of democratic governance.  
The proposed judicial test for the review of anticompetitive government 
measures includes two prongs.  First, the court should scrutinize the decision-
making process to determine whether the adoption of the anticompetitive 
measure was influenced by special interests that stand to benefit from it.  The 
court may consider evidence for the involvement of interest groups in the 
process, as well as their relationships with decision-makers who took part in 
it.  Evidence that decision-makers considered the anticompetitive effects of 
the measure, and the transparency of the process, may also be given weight 
by the reviewing court.  Second, the court should scrutinize the choice of 
means available to the government.  If the purported public purpose of the 
anticompetitive measure could be achieved by a less harmful means to the 
affected public, it could be concluded, even without clear and direct 
evidence, that the measure’s real aim was to effect a private wealth transfer 
in violation of the public use requirement.  Indeed, even if unintentional, an 
unnecessary transfer of wealth from some citizens to others should not be 
permitted by the Constitution.  
Invalidating anticompetitive government measures on the basis of the 
proposed test is justified by the contention that if a less harmful means was 
available to achieve the same purported purpose of the measure, and if the 
decision-making process that led to the adoption of the measure was tainted 
 
 89 Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 
486, 488 (1987). 
 90 Merrill, supra note 81, at 71. 
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with the political influence of the benefitted party, the reasonable 
presumption is that the government measure transfers wealth from the 
diffuse public to the benefited party for the sake of the latter’s purely private 
ends.  Invalidation is the appropriate remedy for the elimination of those 
unjustified wealth transfers, as affording compensation to the members of the 
diffuse public is both impractical and undesirable—following a scheme of 
compensation, the diffuse public will nevertheless end up paying for the 
monopoly profits of the benefited interest group through their tax dollars.  
The rigorous level of scrutiny is justified by the concern that due to the 
systemic failure of the political process, anticompetitive measures are likely 
to reflect the ‘naked preferences’ of interest groups while purporting to 
promote legitimate public purposes.  As Sunstein argued, “[h]eightened 
scrutiny is triggered by a concern that in the circumstances it is especially 
likely that the measure under review reflects a naked preference,”91 and is 
justified by the perception that the groups infringed upon “lack the political 
power to protect themselves against factional tyranny.”92  As Sunstein points 
out, the court may review “government claims that a public value is being 
served,”93 inter-alia by searching for less restrictive alternatives in which 
government could have promoted the public value, seeing that the 
“availability of such alternatives . . . suggests that the public value justification 
is a facade.”94 
This proposed judicial test is not only pertinent but also practical.  The 
task of deciding whether government measures have an anticompetitive 
effect is clearly within the capacity of courts, as they are routinely tasked with 
such analysis in the context of antitrust law; deciding whether an interest 
group was behind a particular anticompetitive measure is also within the 
reach of courts, as demonstrated in several judgments that reflected no 
hesitation to identify such influences;95 and courts are experienced with 
determining whether government employed the least restrictive means in 
 
 91 Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1700. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1699. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 115–16 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(finding that a California regulation, allowing incumbent auto dealers to delay the entry of 
competing franchises to their market, was the result of successful lobbying by auto dealers for an 
anticompetitive benefit).  But see id. at 109 (majority opinion) (holding that the regulation is valid 
because, among other reasons, the Parker state action doctrine exempts it from the reach of antitrust 
laws); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 129–34 (1978) (upholding a 
statute barring oil company ownership of service stations while acknowledging that the statue was 
the product of successful lobbying by retail gasoline dealers seeking competition restraints). 
 
198 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
various constitutional contexts.96  As Krier and Sterk have shown,97 in 
adjudicating takings cases, state courts scrutinize the political processes that 
had generated government regulation and are likely to find takings in cases 
in which the government actors responsible for harm to landowners are least 
likely to be politically accountable. 
The feasibility of implementing this proposal can also be demonstrated 
by numerous incidents where the FTC intervened in the process of 
regulation by advocating against anticompetitive government measures that 
would unnecessarily inflict economic harms on the diffuse public.98  These 
interventions show that it is possible to objectively identify anticompetitive 
measures and to ascertain whether less restrictive means are available to 
achieve their purported public goals.  For example, the FTC warned several 
state legislatures against promulgating certain statutory exemptions to 
antitrust laws that would have allowed physicians to collectively bargain with 
managed health plans.99  Drawing on evidence from similar cases, the FTC 
concluded that such exemptions would lead to an anticompetitive outcome, 
increasing costs and limiting consumer access to care, and argued that the 
measure is not likely to achieve its purported public purpose of improving 
the quality of care, which according to their analysis “can be accomplished 
through less anticompetitive means.”100  In another instance, the FTC 
convinced the Governor of New York to veto a so-called “sale below cost” 
bill that would have prohibited crude oil producers and refiners from selling 
motor fuels below refiner costs, thereby restraining competition between 
these suppliers, and possibly harming consumers without providing a 
countervailing benefit.101  The FTC’s comments argued that the public 
purpose of the measure, which was actually to protect competition, could be 
achieved by less anticompetitive means through existing federal antitrust 
 
 96 Such an inquiry is also the task of international tribunals that, under the rules of international trade 
law, are called upon to curb the influence of anti-trade interest groups by assessing whether 
restrictions on trade are “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.” 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1878 U.N.T.S. 120. 
 97 James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
35, 40 (2016). 
 98 See TODD J. ZYWICKI, FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE 
STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 66–71 (2003) (detailing several instances in which the FTC advocated 
against anticompetitive measures). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 67. 
 101 See Deborah Platt Majoras, State Intervention: A State of Displaced Competition, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1175, 1184 (2006) (discussing the FTC’s advocacy against the NY “sale below cost” gasoline bill). 
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law.102  The FTC’s intervention in these and other cases shows that it is 
possible to objectively demonstrate the existence of the elements of the 
proposed test.103  
A possible objection that can be raised against this proposal is that the 
judicial review of anticompetitive measures may suffer from the very same 
failure that inheres in the political system.  Although the judiciary is the 
branch of government least susceptible to interest-group influence, it is not 
clear that the diffuse group of citizens is more capable of overcoming its 
collective action problem in courts than it is in the public political process.  
One could argue that challenges to anticompetitive government measures 
would rarely make it to courts.  That is because such measures would remain 
below the radar of the harmed individuals or because challenging such 
measures would require some sacrifice by some of the harmed individuals 
whereas the benefit would spread to the entire diffuse group of consumers at 
a low reward per capita.  That would make it irrational for individual 
members of the group to bear the costs of litigation.  
Indeed, the collective action problem inherent in the costs of litigating 
such cases calls for attention.  However, relatively speaking, courts pose to 
diffuse plaintiffs much simpler barriers to collective action than does the 
political process.  Crowdfunding104 and class actions105 could be successfully 
used to facilitate overcoming these barriers.  Besides that, the effects of the 
availability of the proposed framework of judicial review goes beyond the 
particular challenges to anticompetitive measures that could be brought 
under it.  The remedy of ex-post invalidation of anticompetitive government 
measures is aimed to preempt this type of interested wealth transfers and to 
mitigate the capture failure ex-ante.  The availability of judicial review that 
could invalidate such measures should impel decision-makers to conduct 
 
 102 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed New York Motor Fuel Marketing Practices 
Act (Aug. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-filings/2002/08/ftc-staff-
comment-honorable-george-e-pataki-concerning-new (urging the NY Governor to veto the “sales 
below cost” gasoline legislation).  
 103 See Majoras, supra note 101, at 1182–86 (providing several examples in which the FTC has 
intervened in the regulatory process); see also Muris, supra note 38, at 170–73 (describing different 
circumstances in which the FTC interceded in the regulatory process to ensure the government did 
not restrain competition).   
 104 See Ronen Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1368–94 (2018) (analyzing 
crowdfunding and describing why it is an effective tool for overcoming the collective action 
problem). 
 105 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private 
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 84–129 (2003) (describing how the structure 
of class action litigation can offset prohibitively high costs such that pursuing legal action against a 
party to enforce the substantive rights of a disperse category of people becomes more feasible). 
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more inclusive and transparent decision-making processes, to give weight to 
the interests of the diffuse public in competitive prices, and to reduce the 
involvement of special-interest groups in the shaping of public policy that 
affects the diffuse public.  The requirement that the decision-making process 
take competition into account should give the federal antitrust agencies more 
tools to challenge anticompetitive decisions before they are adopted and 
should produce more public information that could assist the diffuse citizens 
in overcoming their collective action problem and empowering them to 
influence public decisions through the political process.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article argued that takings jurisprudence must extend the Takings 
Clause to apply to the protection of the diffuse majority of citizens against 
regulations that transfer wealth to special-interest groups who manage to 
obtain anticompetitive government measures.  The point of departure was 
the observation that the political system is prone to systemically produce 
purely private wealth transfers from the diffuse majority to concentrated 
interest groups due to the disparity of political power between the parties.  
Due to this systemic failure, it is justified—and consistent with the original 
intent of the Framers—to afford heightened constitutional protection to the 
property interests of the diffuse public.  Conceptualizing the purchasing 
power of citizens’ disposable income as constitutionally protected property, 
could safeguard it against regulatory measures that cater to special interests.  
One may ask why this proposition has not emerged before.  Surely, this 
cannot be attributed solely to the rigidity of the takings doctrine.  After all, 
while the Takings Clause was originally intended and interpreted to apply 
only to physical dispossession, the concept of ‘regulatory takings’ has 
ultimately been recognized in the jurisprudence.106  Additionally, property 
rights were invoked in political resistance to environmental regulations that 
restricted land use and indirectly decreased property value.107  Despite all 
 
 106 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 
704 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 383 (1922).  
 107 Several states introduced legislation that protected owners from decreasing value as a result of 
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these, the concept of ‘regulatory taking’ as a ‘taking’ was never extended 
beyond the protection of certain politically savvy and influential sectors.  
The constitutional void that this Article has identified in the 
constitutional protection of the majority’s property could be explained by the 
same collective action problem that precluded the diffuse public from 
influencing government.  Whereas heterogenic and relatively small groups of 
actors have always been able to mobilize political power to protect their 
property, the large and diffuse group of citizens that is harmed by 
anticompetitive public policy could not overcome the collective action 
problem in order to comprehend the source of its loss, let alone to name it 
and to collectively demand protection against it under the law. This is 
nothing new, of course.  Property rights were always defined in the ‘political 
market,’ where different groups possess varying degrees of influence, and not 
only in the economic market.108  Historically, as Mancur Olson elaborates in 
The Rise and Decline of Nations, because smaller groups could organize 
themselves more quickly than their opponents within the nascent 
Westphalian system of sovereign states, they were able to use the state as the 
instrument for obtaining a disproportionate share of the domestic 
resources.109 
Perhaps more fundamentally, it might be the case that the same collective 
action problem prevented the group of diffuse citizens from conceptualizing 
their economic interests as rights entitled to constitutional protection.  An 
interesting contemporary analogy of failure to articulate entitlements can be 
drawn from Eric Posner’s and Glen Weyl’s recent proposal to 
reconceptualize data in the digital market as owned by the users rather than 
by the social media and other companies that provide users services “for free” 
while selling the data to third parties.110  So far the market remains at that 
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equilibrium as consumers are not aware of the value of the data they are 
producing and even if they are, they struggle to act in unison to demand their 
share from the service providers.  As in the case of consumer data, 
reconceptualizing the claim to protecting competitive markets as supported 
under the constitution can help members of diffuse groups to overcome the 
problem of collective action and demand what is theirs. 
 
